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This paper provides a succinct overview of long-run developments regarding public 
finances in Portugal with an emphasis on the spending side. Issues addressed are the 
excessive deficit experiences of Portugal, the past experience with fiscal consolidations, 
and labour cost competitiveness. It is fair to stay that public spending control has been a 
problem in Portugal, and fiscal consolidations in the 1980s and 1990s have been short-
termed and mostly not successful. Additionally, the compensation of general government 
employees diverged vis-à-vis the EU15 after EU entry. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper provides a succinct overview of long-run developments regarding public 
finances in Portugal, with a particular emphasis on the expenditure side. As regularly 
mentioned by international organisations, in the last twenty years or so public spending 
control has been a problem in Portugal, with significant increases in primary spending. 
For instance, the gains obtained from the drop in interest rates and the reduction in the 
interest payments on the outstanding government debt were mostly used to increase 
public spending, and not seen as a window of opportunity to consolidate public finances. 
Indeed, given past performance and outcomes, it seems fair to say that after entering the 
European Union (EU) in 1986, joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992 and adhering to the European and Monetary 
Union (EMU) on January 1999, Portugal’s track record in implementing fiscal policy 
could have been better.  
 
The fiscal consolidations that occurred in the 1980s and in the 1990s have been short-
termed and mostly not successful. Portugal was the first country in the EU to breach the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 2002, becoming therefore subject to the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP), a situation that occurred again in 2005. So far, capital markets 
have given the benefit of the doubt to Portugal, allowing both for mostly stable sovereign 
debt ratings and for low long-term government bond interest rates, with limited spreads 
vis-à-vis the German benchmark. However, this may change in the future in the 
continued absence of good fiscal performance.  
 
Additionally, the compensation of employees in the general government, a relevant 
spending item, notably in terms of demonstration effect for the private sector, diverged 
vis-à-vis the EU15 average after 1987-88, as a share of GDP. Moreover, unit labour costs 
also exhibited a higher growth than in the case of Portugal’s main trading partners. These 
factors, coupled with high external imbalances in the last years, may have impinged 
negatively on Portugal’s competitiveness. 
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The organisation on the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section two offers some 
considerations on the role of public finances in promoting growth. Section three reviews 
developments in public finances in Portugal such as past trends, excessive deficits, the 
capital markets assessment of fiscal outcomes, and episodes of fiscal consolidations. 
Section four addresses developments of general government labour costs. Finally, section 
five presents some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Public finances quality and growth 
 
Public expenditure composition is increasingly the focus of policy debate in the EU while 
international institutions and governments realise that they need to assess expenditure 
performance and efficiency. At the EU level the Working Group for the Quality of Public 
Finances within the Economic Policy Committee carries out such related work and 
analysis. Moreover, the European Commission argues for assessing the fiscal policy 
stance in the Member States also taking into account the quality of spending and of fiscal 
adjustments. Such analysis may also be present when assessing the countries’ Stability 
Programmes, notably in terms of public spending redirecting measures. 
 
Expenditure policies support growth and sustainability if they provide a supportive 
environment for a functioning market economy; limit commitments to so-called core 
and/or productive spending and to basic safety nets; provide services in an efficient 
manner; and maintain sustainable deficits and debt, allowing automatic stabilisers to 
operate.
1 Figure 1 illustrates a possible set of linkages between public finances and 
growth, emphasising public spending composition and efficient outcomes as a relevant 
determinant of economic growth. 
 
Naturally, several problems arise when trying to assess core spending and “high quality” 
of public finances. For instance, even if core spending is needed in such areas as 
education, health, redistribution and infrastructure, this is a hard concept to define. On the 
other hand, even if redistribution may reduce incentives to work, it may also promote 
                                                           
1 On the relevance of public expenditure reform see for instance, ECB (2006).   5
growth, by diminishing the need for high savings and fostering consumption. 
Additionally, international comparability of results is scarce and a demanding exercise.
2  
 
Figure 1 – Public finances and economic growth 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the positioning of OECD countries in terms of the pair performance and 
efficiency of public sector outcomes. In this context, Portugal’s situation clearly suggests 
that there is some room for improvement, both in terms of public spending performance 
and efficiency. Indeed, according to the reported results, Portugal is located in the 
diagram in the lower left-hand side quadrant (together with Italy, Greece, France and 
Spain), implying that other countries are both more effective in producing public sector 
outputs and that they are also more efficient in performing such tasks. 
 
Interestingly, one can also observe the existence of good performing countries (in the two 
right-hand side quadrants) both with lower (Finland, Sweden, and Denmark) and higher 
(Austria, Japan, Ireland, US) efficiency levels. Overall, one can conclude that similar and 
above average public outcomes may be attained with different amounts of resources 
                                                           
2 Available evidence on public spending efficiency, provided by Afonso et al (2005) and Afonso and St. 
Aubyn (2006), report that significant inefficiencies are present in several countries, Portugal included.  
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engaged in public spending activities, and this has to be seen as a country-specific policy 
decision. 
 
Figure 2 – Spending performance and efficiency 
 
Source: adapted from Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005). 
 
3. Developments in public finances 
 
3.1. Past trends 
 
Public expenditure in Portugal has been a challenge for fiscal control and overall 
competitiveness. Past expenditure trends have not been reassuring as can be seen from 
Figure 3, with primary expenditure averaging 23.5, 31.6, and 35.5 per cent of GDP 
respectively in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and reaching an average of 42.9 per cent 
between 2000 and 2006. Naturally, this development tracked, to some extent, the upward 
trend in public spending in the EU15 countries in the past three decades, where a 
significant increase in the total expenditure-to-GDP ratio also occurred from 1970 until 
the beginning of the 1990s, from 35.4 per cent of GDP in 1970 to around 50 per cent of 
GDP in 1993-1995. Thereafter, the total expenditure ratio declined in the EU15 but 
continued to increase in Portugal. 
 





































































































































  Source: European Commission. 
 
The limitations imposed by the need to ensure sound public finances, notably in order to 
meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria, led most EU countries to curb down public 
expenditure behaviour from the mid-1990s onwards. The expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the 
EU15 was reduced from 50.3 per cent in 1995 to 46.2 per cent in 2000, halting therefore 
the raising trend of public expenditures in the EU. More particularly, the ratio of total 
public expenditure-to-GDP declined between 1995 and 2000 for all EU countries, with 
the exception of Greece and Portugal. Shortly after, Portugal was faced with a budget 
deficit above 3 per cent of GDP in 2001 (see Figure 4). 
 
Another conclusion to be drawn from Figure 4 is that in the twenty-one years that passed 
after Portugal’s adhesion to the EU in 1986, only in six years was the general government 
budget deficit below 3 per cent of GDP, averaging around 4 per cent in the entire period. 
In other words, relevant fiscal imbalances were recorded in more than two thirds of the 
period of Portugal’s EU membership. 
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  Source: European Commission. 
 
As a result of an upward trend in public spending and persistent budget deficits, the debt-
to-GDP ratio increased during the 1970-2006 period, with a temporary reversion in the 
second half of the 1990s.
3 The debt ratio averaged 23.8, 48.9, and 56.0 per cent of GDP 
respectively in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, reaching an average of 58.1 per cent 
between 2000 and 2006. Quite telling of a lack of a strong commitment to fiscal 
consolidation efforts in Portugal is the fact that even though the debt ratio declined 10.7 
percentage points (pp) of GDP between 1995 and 2000, notably due to strong growth 
(real GDP growth rate averaged 4.1 per cent in that period), and dropping interest rates, 
the total expenditure ratio did not decline in a sustainable way.
4 
 
Another point worthwhile mentioning, and which can be confirmed with Figure 5, is that 
the actual outcomes of public finances, notably on the spending side, have generally 
turned out worse than initially foreseen. Put in another way, official forecasts have been 
                                                           
3 One should notice that it was in the period 1996-1998 that substantial privatisation revenues were 
obtained, with the amounts channelled to debt redemption adding up to 6.2 per cent of GDP in those three 
years. 
4 In this context Constâncio (2005) argues “Portugal misused fiscal policy twice in the decade” (the 1990s).   9
mostly on the optimistic side. For instance, the 2002 Stability Programme reported for 
2005 an expected spending-to-GDP ratio 3 percentage points below the actual outcome. 
This systematic underestimation of spending also seemed to be a common feature of the 
subsequent updates of the Portuguese Stability Programmes (even if not an isolated case 
in the EU). 
 
Figure 5 – Public spending-to-GDP ratio in the Stability Programmes  
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Source: European Commission and Stability Programmes.  
 
3.2. Excessive deficits 
 
This subsection provides a brief factual stocktaking of the two EDP experiences faced by 
Portugal. As already mentioned above, Portugal was the first country in the EU to breach 
the SGP in 2001, becoming subject to the EDP in 2002, a situation that occurred again in 
2005. After the first EDP for Portugal, both Germany and France also breached the 3 per 
cent limit for the budget deficit in 2002, and become subject to an identical procedure 
respectively in 2002 and in 2003. Figure 6 offers a graphical representation that 
summarises the successive steps of the EDP, commonly considered as the corrective arm 
of the SGP.
5  
                                                           
5 The Stability and Growth Pact consists of a Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997, 
published on 2 August 1997, and of two Regulations of the European Council, N.º 1466/97 and  N.º   10
 
Figure 6 – Excessive Deficit Procedure 
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Source: Adapted from Pereira, P.; Afonso, A.; Arcanjo, M. and Santos, J. (2007). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1467/97, both from 7 July 1997, published on 2 August 1997, modified by Regulations N.º 1055/2005 and 
N.º 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005. See the EC site for additional relevant information on this topic: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/sgp_en.htm.    11
The first EDP for Portugal was launched in 2002, the year of the identification of the 
excessive deficit. On 5 November 2002, the Council decided that an excessive deficit 
existed in Portugal and issued a recommendation requesting Portugal to bring this 
situation to an end by 2003 at the latest. Portugal then opted to address the excessive 
deficit situation still in 2002 (one-off measures amounting to 1.4 per cent of GDP were 
used in that year), therefore avoiding further steps in the procedure. Subsequently the 
Council Decision of 11 May 2004 proposed the abrogation of the decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit in Portugal in accordance to Article 104(12), stating that 
the correction of the excessive deficit was completed in 2003.  
 
In 2003 and 2004 Portugal used again sizable temporary measures, amounting 
respectively to 2.5 and 2.3 per cent of GDP, in order to keep the budget deficit below the 
3 per cent limit. Among the temporary measures implemented in the 2002-2004 period, 
adding up to 6.2 per cent of GDP, one can recall the more relevant ones: 
 
i) In 2004, the transfers from public sector enterprises to CGA (civil servants pension 
system) as counterpart for the assumption by the general government of future pension 
liabilities of the employees of those enterprises;
6  
ii) In 2003, the securitization of tax credits, which were sold to a resident non-monetary 
financial institution (comprising taxes and social contributions concerning the period 1 
January 1993 to 30 September 2003); 
iii) In 2003, transfers from CTT (Portuguese postal operator) to CGA and to the Treasury, 
in exchange of the future payment of pensions; 
iv) In 2002, the extraordinary settlement of tax arrears programme (a tax amnesty), the 




                                                           
6 Transfers were made from the following state-owned enterprises: Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Navegação 
Aérea de Portugal, Aeroportos de Portugal, and Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda. 
7 Portugal was not alone in the EU regarding the use of temporary measures, which were also used in 
Belgium (transfers in 2003 from Belgacom to the general government in exchange for future payment of 
pensions), in Italy (securitization operation in 2002). Additionally, the regularization of tax debts was also 
implemented in several other countries: Ireland in 2002, Greece in 2002 and 2003, and Italy in 2003. 
   12
The adoption of such strategy, making use of temporary measures, even if it prevented 
the budget deficit from going above the 3 per cent limit, did not address the structural 
factors behind the underlying Portuguese fiscal imbalances. Additionally, after the 2002 
EDP, the consolidation strategy also included an increase in the standard VAT rate (from   




The second EDP was initiated against Portugal in 2005 via a Council Decision of 20 
September 2005, in line with article 104(6). The deadline of 2008 was given for Portugal 
to correct the situation. Additionally, the Commission recommended to Portugal a 
reduction of the cyclically-adjusted deficit, excluding one-off and other temporary 
measures, by 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2006, and at least ¾ per cent of GDP in 2007 and in 
2008. Under Article 104(7) a Council Recommendation was also adopted on 7 October 
2005 asking Portugal to take effective action regarding the measures needed to address 
the excessive deficit situation.
9  
 
Against this background, a word is in order regarding some limitations concerning the 
monitoring and collection of fiscal data. A specific commission led by the Banco de 
Portugal was created in 2002 to determine the value of the 2001 budget deficit. It was on 
the basis of that outcome, showing a much higher deficit than the one previously reported 
by the national authorities to Brussels that the first EDP for Portugal was triggered.  
 
Yet again in 2005, another commission under the aegis of the Banco de Portugal 
concluded for the existence of still a higher number for the budget deficit in that year, 
more specifically of twice the 3 per cent limit. As already mentioned, Portugal then faced 
the second EDP in 2005. Therefore, it is somewhat worrying that in the past some 
limitations prevented the fiscal and statistical authorities of being able of accurately 
monitoring the outcomes of the several public finances related variables. Indeed, and 
even if this is not an easy task, one expects all steps of the budgetary process and the 
                                                           
8 Guichard and Leibfritz (2006) also survey the reasons for the non-successful fiscal adjustment in the 
period 2002-2004. 
9 A detailed timeline regarding the excessive deficit procedures for Portugal is presented in Appendix 1.   13
ensuing implementation and monitoring of fiscal policy to be tackled in a timely fashion 
by the fiscal authorities. 
 
The second EDP was still underway at the end of 2006, and among the several measures 
proposed by the authorities to control primary spending, one can mention as some of the 
more structurally oriented ones, for instance, the revision of the civil servants’ pension 
schemes (see section 4), and the reform of the health care sector.
10 
  
Portugal’s difficulties and experiences with excessive deficit situations are not an 
exception in the EU. As a matter of fact, in the last years other members of the EU also 
faced an EDP (in the euro area Portugal, Greece, France, Germany and Italy were 
undergoing an EDP at the end of 2006).
11 Table 1 provides the development of the 
relevant fiscal variables, budget deficit and general government debt, for each country in 
1996 and in 2006.
12  
 
Table 1 – Budget balance and debt-to-GDP ratios 
 
Source: EC, autumn 2006 forecasts. 
 
                                                           
10 Actually, since 2002, some public hospitals have been transformed into public corporations, in an attempt 
to increase efficiency and decrease costs in the National Health Service, and the verdict is still out on the 
efficacy of these measures. 
11 By the end of 2006, other countries already faced an EDP: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, and Slovak Republic. Additionally, in 2004 both the UK and the Netherlands found themselves in 
excessive deficit, vis-à-vis the 2003 budget deficit outcome. 
12 For the status of the EDP on a country basis, one can see the main relevant information at the EC site: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/procedures_en.htm.  
     Budget balance               Debt      Budget balance               Debt
1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006
Austria -2.2 -1.3 66.5 62.1 Czech Republic -3.6 -3.5 15.8 30.9
Belgium -0.5 -0.2 113.6 89.4 Cyprus -4.4 -1.9 59.7 64.8
Denmark 2.3 4.0 57.4 28.5 Estonia -3.7 2.5 6.2 4.0
Finland 1.7 2.9 46.7 38.8 Hungary -5.5 -10.1 60.0 67.6
France -1.7 -2.7 58.3 64.7 Latvia -5.3 -1.0 12.4 11.1
Germany -1.5 -2.3 60.2 67.8 Lithuania -2.9 -1.0 23.0 18.9
Greece -3.4 -2.6 112.3 104.8 Malta -7.7 -2.9 56.4 69.6
Ireland 2.5 1.2 48.1 25.8 Poland -1.8 -2.2 39.3 42.4
Italy -1.7 -4.7 113.7 107.2 Slovak Republic -7.1 -3.4 47.4 33.0
Luxemburg 3.3 -1.5 5.6 7.4 Slovenia -2.0 -1.6 24.6 28.4
Netherlands 0.6 0.0 60.5 50.5 EU-25 -2.0 62.5
Portugal -2.7 -4.6 51.4 67.4 Bulgaria * 0.1 * 3.3 54.0 * 25.8
Spain -1.1 1.5 61.6 39.7 Romania 0.7 -1.4 24.0 13.7
Sweden 2.5 2.8 62.2 46.7
United Kingdom 1.1 -2.9 44.2 43.2
Euro area -1.3 -2.0 71.7 69.4 * 2002 budget balance and debt.  14
From Table 1, one can see that according to the EC forecasts, two of the euro area 
countries had in 2006 a deficit above 3 per cent of GDP (Italy and Portugal), and seven 
countries still had a debt-to-GDP ratio higher than the 60 per cent threshold. Regarding 
the EU new Member States, three countries reported a deficit above 3 per cent (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic), while three countries surpassed the debt 
ratio limit (Cyprus, Hungary and Malta). 
 
According to Afonso and Claeys (2006), the main reasons for the three initial breaches of 
the SGP in 2002 and 2003 seem to be expenditure rises in France and Portugal, while 
large revenue reductions unmatched by expenditure cuts in Germany pushed the deficit 
beyond 3 per cent of GDP. This evidence again seems to point, as already mentioned, to 
some difficulties related to expenditure control in the case of Portugal. 
 
3.3. The capital markets view 
 
After entering the EU in 1986 both inflation and interest rates in Portugal decreased 
steadily and converged towards the lower levels that were more common in other 
countries in Europe. This was an obvious benefit from entering the EU, with capital 
markets adjusting its expectations vis-à-vis Portugal, which also allowed for better and 
more stable sovereign debt ratings attributed to the country.  
 
Undeniably, Portugal was one of the countries that most had to gain from the decrease in 
interest rates, given the quite high inflation and interest rate levels that it incurred in the 
past. Indeed, between 1985 and 1993, the long-term interest rate decreased around 1650 
basis points (bp), opening an extremely important window of opportunity to engage in 
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Source: European Commission. 
 
Regarding recent developments in sovereign credit ratings in the euro area, in 2006 only 
the rating for Italy was reduced. On October 2006 Standard & Poor's (S&P) lowered its 
rating notation on Italian sovereign debt from AA- to A+ while Fitch decreased its own 
rating assessment from AA to AA-. The downgrade from Fitch moved Italian sovereign 
debt from the usually labelled “high quality” borrowing to the “strong payment capacity” 
category.  
 
The sovereign credit ratings at the end of 2006 in the euro area are reported in Table 2. 
One can also notice that the minimum credit rating for collateral, accepted by the 
European Central Bank for its financial market activities, is a least A- from S&P or Fitch 
or at least A3 from Moody’s. 
 
Interestingly, the announcement of the rating downgrade for Italy in 2006 had a 
somewhat benign effect on its 10-year government bond yield. Moreover, the yields of 
the 10-year government bonds of Portugal have been steadily located, since the middle of 
2005, inside a range between the yields of Greece and Italy in the upper bound, and the 
yields of Germany and France in the lower bound (see Figure 8). Additionally, the   16
spreads for Portugal vis-à-vis Germany have remained almost stable during the last two 
years.  
 
Table 2 – Sovereign credit ratings for euro area countries (December 2006) 
 
Ratings  Characterization of 
debt and issuer 
(source: Moody’s)  S&P Countries  Moody’s Countries    Fitch Countries 
Highest quality 
AAA 
AT, DE, ES, 
FI, FR, IR, 
LU, NL 
Aaa 
AT, DE, ES, 
FI,  FR, IR, 
LU, NL 
AAA 
AT, DE, ES, 
FI,  FR, IR, 
LU, NL 
AA+ BE  Aa1  BE AA+ BE 
AA  SL  Aa2 IT,  PT  AA  PT 
 
High quality 
AA- PT  Aa3  SL  AA- IT,  SL 
A +  IT  A1  GR  A+   




A-   A3   A-  
Sources: S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch. 
 









































































































































































So far capital markets seem to have given the benefit of the doubt to Portugal in spite of 
less than reassuring past fiscal developments. Actually, empirical evidence suggests that 
the interest rate differentials do not react much to changes in the fundamentals, being the 
bond yields in the euro area bond market mostly driven by common factors. Naturally, 
this increases the relevance of sound fiscal policies in a monetary union in order to avoid   17
negative spillover effects as pointed out, for instance, by Detken, Gaspar and Winkler 
(2004). 
 
On the other hand, and as mentioned by Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2007), fiscal 
performance does matter in determining sovereign credit ratings. Moreover, according to 
S&P and Fitch, the downgrade of Italian sovereign debt in 2006 was due to the fact that 
the 2007 Budget relied more on revenue measures to cut down the general government 
deficit, a strategy that did not address the expenditure side, notably current spending. 
Therefore, other EU countries with fiscal imbalances cannot really dismiss lightly this 
credit rating downgrade episode regarding Italy. 
 
3.4. Stress test 
 
In order to simulate and assess in a straightforward way possible future paths for public 
finances in Portugal, one can use the arithmetic of the government budget constraint,  
 
  11 () tt t t tt t bb g in b ρ − − −= − + −       (1) 
 
where  b is the debt-to-GDP ratio, g is the primary spending-to-GDP ratio, ρ is the 
revenue-to-GDP ratio, and i and n are respectively the nominal long-term interest rate and 
the nominal GDP growth rate.
13 The simulation for the debt ratio at time t may then be 
computed from  
 
  11 () tt tttt t bb g in b ρ − − =+ − + − ,      (2) 
 
while the budget balance, d, can be calculated from 
 
  1 tt t t t dg i b ρ − = −− .      (3) 
 
                                                           
13 See, for instance, Afonso (2005), for more details on the budget constraint arithmetic.   18
The main assumptions used in the calculations, throughout a period of four years ahead 
are as follows: nominal GDP growth rate, 3.5 per cent; nominal long-term interest rate, 
4.5 per cent; expenditure ratio development, -0.5 pp of GDP annually; revenue ratio 
development, 0.0 pp annually.
14  
 
Making a simple stress test using (2) and (3), for the period 2007-2010, shows the 
difficulties underlining the development in Portuguese public finances, and Figure 9 
presents the results of such exercise. The main conclusion is that given past spending and 
revenue dynamics, and sensible and cautious assumptions for future spending and 
revenues, it may take four to five years for Portugal to overcome a situation of excessive 
deficit, once the budget deficit is as high as twice the three per cent threshold, and 
government debt is approximately 67 per cent of GDP.  
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Sources: European Commission, autumn 2006 Forecasts and Portuguese Stability Programme 
2006-2010 (December 2006), and author’s calculations. Note: the line with the square mark for the 
budget balance excludes one-off measures amounting to 1.4, 2.5, and 2.3 per cent of GDP 
respectively in 2002, 2003, and 2004. 
 
Portugal’s difficulties are compounded by the lack of a convincing cyclical recovery. 
According to the European Commission, the output gap in Portugal has been negative, 
                                                           
14 Regarding the development of the public spending ratio, an assumption of -0.5 pp annually for four years 
could be considered somewhat optimistic since the data show an increase of +0.5 pp annually in the four-
year period ending in 2006.   19
averaging -1.0 per cent in the 2002-2006 period, which is twice as much as the one 
observed in the euro area. Finally, the rate of capacity utilization has also been 
historically low in recent years. 
 
3.5. Fiscal consolidations 
 
Regarding the past experiences in terms of fiscal consolidations, Table 3 identifies the 
fiscal episodes in the EU15 countries, based on the change in the cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balance. For this purpose, Afonso (2006) determined the periods when 
the change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 2 pp of GDP in 
one year or at least 1.5 pp points on average in the last two years. For the case of 
Portugal, Table 3 reports two episodes of fiscal contraction and three episodes of fiscal 
expansion between 1970 and 2005: 1982-83, 1986, and 1992.  
 
Table 3 – Fiscal episodes (1970-2005) 
 
Source: adapted from Afonso (2006), following the measure used by Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998).  
 
Recalling Figure 4, it is possible to see that the abovementioned fiscal consolidation 
episodes were, on the one hand short-termed, and on the other hand mostly unsuccessful. 
Expansions Contractions Expansions Contractions
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FR  20
During the 1982-83 consolidation both expenditures and revenues increased, as a share of 
GDP, while the debt-to-GDP ratio kept on increasing at the same time.
15  
 
Regarding the 1986 consolidation (the year of Portugal’s entry in the EU), one observes 
in that period a certain stabilization of revenues as a share of GDP, a decrease in the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio, and also a decrease in the debt ratio in the following three 




Finally, the 1992 episode was very short-termed, taking place in a difficult environment, 
following revenue and expenditure increases with the debt ratio rising immediately 
afterwards.
17 Moreover, the 1993 economic downturn in Europe did not play in favour of 
prolonging the consolidation, with the primary spending-to-GDP ratio increasing more 
significantly in that year. Indeed, a known feature of fiscal policies in Portugal in the past 
has been the pro-cyclical behaviour of primary spending, which contributed to prevent 
the implementation of successful fiscal consolidations (see, for instance, Pina, 2004). 
Such pro-cyclical behaviour would again be present in 2001, with the budget deficit 
going once more above the 3 per cent limit. 
 
According to the existent literature, one would be more inclined to attribute a higher 
degree of success to a fiscal consolidation if it is more based on the reduction of primary 
current expenditure than on the increase on revenues or on the reduction of capital 
spending. For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1997) define two types of fiscal adjustment: 
Type 1 adjustment, when the budget deficit is reduced through cuts in social expenditures 
(unemployment subsidies, minimum income subsidies) and cuts in public sector wages; 
and Type 2 adjustment, when the budget deficit is reduced with the increase of taxes on 
                                                           
15 It is also worthwhile mentioning that the Portuguese Escudo effective exchange rate faced a devaluation 
of 17 and 23 per cent respectively in 1982 and 1983, while Portugal undertook an IMF stabilisation 
programme. 
16 In that year also occurred the effective introduction of VAT, and Portugal started receiving European 
funds. 
17 Additionally, in 1992 and in 1993 privatisation revenues amounting respectively to 1.5 and 0.4 per cent 
of GDP were used for debt redemption. Coincidentally Portugal entered the ERM in April 1992, precisely 
the year were several currencies in the ERM system undergone speculative attacks, forcing both the Italian 
Lira and the British Pound out of the system after September 2002.   21
labour income and with cuts in public investment expenditures. Against this background, 
one could tentatively label the episodes of fiscal consolidation of 1982-83 and 1992 more 
likely as Type 2 adjustments, while the 1986 episode may have had more features of a 
Type 1 adjustment. 
 
4. Compensation of employees and competitiveness 
 
Compensation of employees in Portugal diverged vis-à-vis the EU15 average after the 
adhesion to the EU in 1986, a development that may have impinged adversely on the 
country’s competitiveness. Indeed, compensation of employees as a share of GDP 
increased roughly 1.0 percentage point of GDP for the EU15 countries, between 1970 and 
2006 while it increased quite more substantially in Portugal (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10 - Compensation of employees (% of GDP), Portugal and EU15 








































































To better place the Portuguese case in the broader picture of the EU15, it is important to 
mention the existence of large differences both among countries and through time in 
terms of this public spending category. For instance, one can mention that compensation 
of employees as a share of GDP in 1980 ranged from 9.4 per cent in Greece and Spain to 
18.0 and 20.2 per cent in Denmark and Sweden. On the other hand, in 2006 the lowest   22
values for those ratios were 7.2, 8.1 and 9.6 per cent respectively in Germany, 
Luxembourg and in the Netherlands, while the highest reported values were 17.0 per cent 
in Denmark, 15.9 per cent in Sweden and 14.2 per cent in Portugal (see Figure 11). 
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Source: European Commission. 
 
In spite of the moderate general increase in the share of compensation of employees in 
GDP, between 1970 and 2006 in the EU15, the compensation of employees-to-GDP ratio 
did increase more significantly in five countries: Portugal, Greece, Finland, Denmark, 
and Spain. The biggest increases during that period occurred in Portugal and Greece, with 
respectively changes of 6.9 and 4.1 percentage points. On the other hand, compensation 
of employees as a share of GDP either decreased between 1970 and 2006 in three 
countries, Germany, Netherlands and Austria, or remained broadly stable in Ireland. 
 
A different way of looking at the weight of the compensation of employees, it to notice 
that in the EU15 such public spending item accounted for 27.6 per cent of the general 
government’s total expenditures in 1970, decreasing to 22.8 per cent in 2006 (a decline of 
4.9 pp). Once more it is possible to identify significant differences among the EU15 
countries. In 2006, the weight of public sector compensation of employees ranged from 
15.7, 18.4 and 18.8 per cent of total expenditure in Germany, Luxembourg and Austria to   23
33.4 and 29.5 per cent respectively in Denmark and in Portugal (see Appendix 2 for 
country details). 
 
In order to assess the contributions to the change in the compensation of employees, it is 
possible to decompose the variation of that spending category as follows: 
 
 
Effect via Effect via Cross effect
change in change in (residual)
civil servants average spending
WN w w N N w ∆ = ∆×+∆× + ∆× ∆ 	
 	
   	 
      (4) 
 
where we have: W – compensation of employees (general government); N – number of 
civil servants (as recorded in the CGA); and w – average spending per employee (W/N).
18 
The results for Portugal for the period 1989-2005, using the decomposition equation (4), 
are presented in Figure 12. 
 























































































Change in civil servants Change in average spending
Cross effect
 
Source: CGA, EC, and author’s calculations. 
                                                           
18 CGA manages the Portuguese civil servants (appointed until 2005-12-31) pension’s scheme (retirement, 
survivor and other minor special pensions). This contributory pay-as-you-go special scheme covers also 
teachers from private schools and workers of some public (or State owned though private) companies 
appointed until 2005-12-31. See Appendix 2 for the data used in equation (4). 
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Between 1989 and 1992, a period of strong increase in the share of the compensation of 
public employees in GDP, the increase in the average spending per civil servant was 
essentially the main driving force. On the other hand, it is possible to observe a period of 
four years, 1998-2001, where the increase in the number of civil servants contributed 
more significantly to the overall increase in the compensation of employees-to-GDP 
ratio. Still one also notices the negative contribution from the change in civil servants 
observed in 2004. 
 
In this context, it is worthwhile mentioning the recent reform of the public sector 
employees’ pension system, which apart from being intended to contribute to curb 
primary spending in the general government, may constitute in the medium-term an 
additional incentive for civil servants to move from the public to the private sector.
19 
 
Another relevant dimension, related to Portugal’s external competitiveness, can be 
assessed by comparing both the compensation of general government employees and 
labour costs with the realities’ of Portugal’s traditionally main trading partners. This 
comparison is done in Figures 13a-c for Spain, France, Germany and the UK. 
 
In terms of the share in GDP of the compensation of general government employees, such 
ratio has been in Portugal above the observed in Germany, Spain, France, and the UK for 
most of the last ten years (see Figure 13a). Regarding the compensation of employees for 
the total economy, the picture is opposite, with the respective ratio to GDP being lower in 
Portugal. Nevertheless, such ratio also increased after 1998, and actually surpassed the 
corresponding ratio for Spain in 2005 (see Figure 13b). Finally, Figure 13c reports real 
unit labour costs developments showing an upward trend for the case of Portugal after 
2000, in opposition to the mostly downward trend that occurred in Portugal’s four main 
trading partners. 
                                                           
19 Among the measures implemented under the revised civil servants’ pension scheme we can mention the 
stepwise rise (six month every year) in the retirement age from 60 to 65 years, during the period 2006-
2015, and the increase, in the same stepwise fashion, in the number of working years to receive the full 
pension, from 36 to 40 years, during the period 2006-2013.   25
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5. Conclusion 
 
In the past, public spending control has been a problem in Portugal, with significant 
increases in primary spending. In the period of twenty-one years after Portugal’s adhesion 
to the EU in 1986, only in six years was the budget deficit below the 3 per cent of GDP, 
averaging around 4 per cent in the entire period. Certainly, the fiscal consolidations that 
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s have been short-termed and mostly not successful. 
 
Quite telling of a lack of a strong commitment to sustainable fiscal consolidation efforts 
in Portugal is the fact that even though the debt ratio declined during some periods, 
notably due to strong growth, and dropping interest rates, the total expenditure ratio did 
not decline simultaneously. Indeed, between 1985 and 1993, the long-term interest rate 
decreased around 1650 bp and it then further declined by some 700 bp from 1993 to 
2003. So far, capital markets have given the benefit of the doubt to Portugal, but this may 
change in the future in the absence of good fiscal performance. 
 
The compensation of general government employees, as a share of GDP, diverged vis-à-
vis the EU15 average after 1987-88, while overall, unit labour costs exhibited a higher 
growth than in the case of Portugal’s main trading partners. The rise in the share of the 
compensation of public employees in GDP was related to the increase in average 
spending per civil servant between 1989 and 1992, and notably also to the increase in the 
number of civil servants in the period 1998-2001. 
 
Some of the experiences of Portugal, both the preparation to the euro and the euro 
experience itself, may provide useful insights to the EU new Member States that will 
adopt the single currency in the future. Indeed, one must be aware of the implications and 
requisites of the need of sound fiscal policies coupled with a single monetary policy, in 
order to adjust procedures and take full advantage of such policy environment. 
 
Finally, one can briefly sketch some desirable features that should surround the 
implementation of fiscal policy in Portugal: fiscal policy should not be pro-cyclical; 
consolidations need to be pursued in order to attain a sound fiscal position that can deal   27
with unforeseen shocks and prepare for the future fiscal costs of ageing populations; 
structural measures rather than temporary ones should be favoured; the fiscal authorities 
should monitor, collect, and provide comprehensive fiscal data in a timely fashion for all 
sub-sectors of the general government; a periodical assessment of public finances 
objectives and implementation, from an autonomous perspective, would also be 
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EDP timeline for Portugal 
 
Date Report/Recommendation/Decision 
24 Sep 2002  Commission report [104(3)] 
 
16 Oct 2002  Commission opinion [104(5)] and recommendation for a 
Council decision [104(6)] and recommendation [104(7)] 
 
5 Nov 2002  Council decision [104(6)] 
Council recommendation [104(7)] 
 
28 Apr 2004  Commission recommendation for a Council decision 
[104(12)] abrogating the Decision on the existence of an 
excessive deficit 
 
11 May 2004  Council decision [104(12)] to abrogate the Decision on 
the existence of an excessive deficit 
 
22 Jun 2005  Commission report [104(3)] 
 
20 Jul 2005  Commission opinion [104(5)] and recommendation for a 
Council decision [104(6)] and recommendation [104(7)] 
 
7 Oct 2005  Council decision [104(6)] 
Council recommendation [104(7)] 
 
21 Jun 2006  Commission communication to the Council on the action 
taken is response to the Council recommendations under 
the excessive deficit procedure 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A1 – Compensation of employees (General Government, % of GDP) 
  Total spending (1)  Compensation of employees (2) (1)/(2) 
 1970  2006 
change 
(pp) 1970 2006 
change 
(pp) 1970 2006 
change 
(pp) 
AUT  37.1 48.6 11.4  9.9  9.1  -0.7 26.6 18.8 -7.8 
BEL  38.9 49.6 10.7  9.8  12.1  2.3  25.1 24.4 -0.7 
DEU  37.7  46.1  8.4 8.6 7.2 -1.4  22.8  15.7  -7.1 
DNK  40.1 50.8 10.7 13.4 17.0  3.6  33.4 33.4  0.0 
ESP  20.3 38.3 18.1  6.3  9.8  3.5  31.0 25.6 -5.4 
FIN  29.6 49.9 20.3 10.1 13.8  3.7  33.9 27.6 -6.3 
FRA  36.7 54.0 17.4 10.5 13.2  2.7  28.5 24.4 -4.1 
GBR  36.3 45.2  8.9  10.5 11.3  0.8  28.9 25.0 -3.8 
GRC  24.2 44.9 20.7  8.2  12.3  4.1  33.7 27.4 -6.3 
IRE  33.8 34.9  1.1  10.0 10.1  0.1  29.6 29.0 -0.6 
ITA  32.1 48.1 16.0  9.6  11.0  1.4  30.0 22.9 -7.1 
LUX  25.3 44.0 18.7  6.2  8.1  1.9  24.6 18.4 -6.2 
NLD  38.4  47.7 9.3 10.5 9.6 -0.8 27.2  20.2 -7.0 
PRT  18.7 48.0 29.3  7.2  14.2  6.9  38.7 29.5 -9.2 
SWE  41.8 55.9 14.1 14.0 15.9  1.9  33.5 28.5 -5.0 
E15  35.4 47.3 11.9  9.8  10.8  1.0  27.6 22.8 -4.9 
Source: European Commission. Note: numbers may not add up due to rounding. 
 



















1988  615515 - 3937010 - 6.396 
1989 634001  3.0  4931670  25.3  7.779 
1990 653842  3.1  6011700  21.9  9.194 
1991 665236  1.7  7504690  24.8  11.281 
1992 668715  0.5  9087470  21.1  13.589 
1993 661347  -1.1  9759280  7.4  14.757 
1994 638327  -3.5  10184340  4.4  15.955 
1995 637749  -0.1  10990150  7.9  17.233 
1996 647893  1.6  11828910  7.6  18.258 
1997 654228  1.0  12841880  8.6  19.629 
1998 681169  4.1  14096300  9.8  20.694 
1999 709167  4.1  15599830  10.7  21.997 
2000 747449  5.4  17328770  11.1  23.184 
2001 771285  3.2  18515950  6.9  24.007 
2002 778782  1.0  19906640  7.5  25.561 
2003 778357  -0.1  19567660  -1.7  25.140 
2004 737355  -5.3  20376270  4.1  27.634 
2005 739664  0.3  21327560  4.7  28.834 
Source: CGA, European Commission. CGA manages the Portuguese civil servants (appointed until 
2005-12-31) pension’s scheme (retirement, survivor and other minor special pensions). This 
contributory pay-as-you-go special scheme covers also teachers from private schools and workers of 
some public (or State owned though private) companies appointed until 2005-12-31. 